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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is before the Court after a grant of a Writ of Certiorari.  This 
Court has jurisdiction under 78A-3-102(3)(a) to hear an appeal from the 
adjudication of the Court of Appeals.  The Court of Appeals heard an appeal 
from a final Judgment of the Third Judicial District Court under 78A-4-
103(2)(j).   
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding any 
modification of the lease agreement only extended the time for making 
payments.   
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the 
Court of Appeals. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
Issue No. 2: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding an 
extension of time to make payments did not constitute a material 
modification of the lease that relieved the Petitioner of any obligations as 
guarantor. 
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Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the 
Court of Appeals. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
Issue No. 3:  Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declining to 
address Petitioner’s arguments for an alternate ground for affirmance and in 
remanding with a directive to enter judgment in favor of Respondent.   
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Supreme Court reviews the 
decision of the Court of Appeals for correctness, ceding no deference to the 
Court of Appeals. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶ 11, 103 P.3d 699. 
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below: 
Plaintiff/Respondent, PC Riverview (Plaintiff), brought an action 
against former Tenant, Defendant Hong Gaung Lin (Defendant Lin) for 
unpaid rent.  The complaint also included a cause of action against 
Defendant/Petitioner Xiao-Yan Cao (Defendant Cao) as a guarantor on the 
lease.  This is the second action filed by the Plaintiff against the Defendants.  
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In the first case filed May 18, 2010, Case No. 100908746, Defendant Cao 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against the Plaintiff on August 23, 
2010, asserting that the Plaintiff lacked standing to bring an action on the 
guarantee against Defendant Cao because there was no privity of contract 
between the Plaintiff and Defendant Cao and no evidence that the guarantee 
was assigned to the Plaintiff from the prior landlord, Riverview Properties.  
On October 28, 2010, the Third District Court, the Honorable L.A. Dever, 
presiding, issued a minute entry order favorable to Defendant Cao.  The 
Trial Court found that the Plaintiff failed to provide evidence of any alleged 
transfer of interest.  The Trial Court stayed final entry of the order to allow 
the parties to attend mediation.  On November 1, 2010, Plaintiff provided 
Defendant Cao with an Agreement that was reached between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin on September 8, 2010. Plaintiff requested Defendant Cao’s 
stipulation to dismissal of that case.  On November 3, 2010, Defendant Cao 
notified Plaintiff that Defendant Cao would not agree to the dismissal of the 
case.  Defendant Cao was not involved in the negotiations between Plaintiff 
and Defendant Lin, Defendant Cao had no knowledge of the Agreement 
between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin when it was agreed upon by the parties.  
Defendant Cao also stated that the new Agreement between Plaintiff and 
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Defendant Lin abrogated Defendant Cao’s surety obligations under the prior 
Lease Agreement.  Plaintiff provided no response to Defendant Cao’s letter.  
Plaintiff failed to further prosecute Case No. 10090874.  Eventually, the case 
was dismissed for lack of prosecution on October 17, 2011.  On March 3, 
2014, Plaintiff filed the current action, Case No. 149902947, again claiming 
that Defendant Cao was the surety for the Agreement between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin.  Plaintiff obtained summary judgment against Defendant 
Lin.  Plaintiff was awarded $7,326.55 in damages, $1,208.88 in prejudgment 
interest, $117.00 in costs and $1,400.00 in attorney’s fees.  On April 29, 
2015, a bench trial was held, the Honorable Katie Bernards-Goodman 
presided.  After hearing the evidence, the Trial Court issued its ruling from 
the bench.  The Trial Court found that Plaintiff and Defendant Lin materially 
modified the lease agreement thereby negating the suretyship of Defendant 
Cao.  Because the Trial Court found in Defendant Cao’s favor regarding the 
modification, the Trial Court declined to rule on Defendant Cao’s argument 
that the assignment of the guarantee from Riverview Properties to PC 
Riverview was improper.  An Order and Judgment was signed by the Court 
on May 26, 2015.  The Plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2015.  
The Court of Appeals issued its decision on August 25, 2016 reversing the 
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Trial Court and ordering the Trial Court to enter judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff.   
Statement of Facts: 
 
1. On or about October 7, 2003, Chai Teng Tsoa and Hong Min 
Zhang assigned their interest in a Lease with Riverview Properties to L&C 
Unlimited, with the approval of the Landlord, Riverview Properties.  
Defendant Cao signed the Lease personally as Guarantor to the agreement.  
The Lease expired on September 30, 2008.  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 6.   
2. On or about March 9, 2006, L&C Unlimited assigned their 
interest in a Lease with Riverview Properties to Hong G. Lin, with the 
approval of the Landlord, Riverview Properties.  Defendant Lin signed a 
Guarantee to the Lease.  Defendant Cao signed the Lease as Guarantor.  
Defendant Lin signed a Guarantee to the Lease.  The Lease for Hong G. Lin 
was extended to September 30, 2013.  Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibit 7.   
3. On or about June 19, 2006, PC Riverview acquired the leased 
property from Riverview Properties.  TT(Trial Transcript) page 8. 
4. On May 20, 2010, Defendant Cao was served with the 
Complaint in Case No. 10090874, CR (Court Record) page 108-110, TT 39. 
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5. Prior to being served with the Complaint, Defendant Cao was 
given no notice of that Defendant Lin had failed to make payments under the 
Lease.  TT 39-40. 
6. Prior to being served with the Complaint, Defendant Cao was 
given no notice of the transfer of the property from Riverview Properties and 
PC Riverview.  TT 40-41. 
7. On June 28, 2010, Defendant Cao filed a Motion to Compel 
Eviction Proceedings in Case No. 10090874.  CR 108-110, TT 37-38. 
8. On or about July 2, 2010, Plaintiff filed an Opposition to 
Motion to Compel Eviction, along with a Declaration of Carolyn Carter with 
the Court.  CR 112-13. 
9. According to Carolyn Carter, Plaintiff elected to delay 
enforcement of Defendant Lin’s obligations in exchange for partial 
payments.  The Plaintiff accepted partial payments from Defendant Lin for 
several months prior to filing their Complaint against Defendant Cao and 
Defendant Lin.  CR 112-13.  
10. Records produced by the Plaintiff show that Defendant Lin was 
behind on his rent obligations starting in October 2008.  CR 034. 
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11. By the time Plaintiff filed their initial lawsuit in May 2010, 
Defendant Lin was $20,050.12 behind in his rent.  CR 036. 
12. In May, 2010, Defendant Lin incurred $969.25 in late charges 
for the month of May for his outstanding balance.  CR 36. 
13. The late charges reached a peak of $1,069.18 in June 2010. CR 
36. 
14. Defendant Cao was completely unaware of this business 
arrangement between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin.  TT 39-40. 
15. On August 23, 2010, Defendant Cao filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment in Case No. 10090874.  CR 108-110. 
16. On September 8, 2010, Plaintiff and Defendant Lin reached an 
agreement whereby they modified the payments due to Plaintiff from 
Defendant Lin.  Defendant’s Trial Exhibit 2. 
17. When Plaintiff and Defendant Lin reached their agreement, 
Defendant Lin owed the Plaintiff $23,951.28. CR 036 and Defendant’s 
Exhibit 2.  
18. The Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin 
acknowledges that it included 7/8th of the late fees that Defendant Lin 
incurred. Defendant’s Exhibit 2. 
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19. On September 14, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment.  Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition 
to Summary Judgment failed to notify Defendant Cao or the Court that 
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin had reached an agreement modifying the terms 
of the Lease.  CR 108-110 
20. On September 27, 2010, Defendant Cao filed a Reply 
Memorandum. CR 108-110 
21. On October 28, 2010, the Court issued a ruling on Defendant 
Cao’s Motion for Summary Judgment.  The Court looked favorably on 
Defendant Cao’s Motion; however, the Court stayed final decision on the 
matter while the parties attempted a resolution through ADR.  Defendant 
Exhibit 1. 
22. On November 1, 2010, Plaintiff faxed the Agreement between 
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin to Defendant Cao. Defendant’s Exhibit 2. 
23. On November 3, 2010, Defendant Cao sent a letter to Plaintiff 
notifying Plaintiff that Defendant Cao would not agree to the dismissal of 
the case.  Defendant Cao was not involved in the negotiations between 
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin, Defendant Cao had no knowledge of the 
Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin when it was agreed upon by 
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the parties.  Defendant Cao also stated that the new Agreement between 
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin abrogated Defendant Cao’s surety obligations 
under the prior Lease Agreement.  Defendant’s Exhibit 3. 
24. Plaintiff provided no response to Defendant Cao’s letter.  
Plaintiff failed to further prosecute Case No. 10090874.  Eventually, the case 
was dismissed for lack of prosecution on October 17, 2011.  CR 108-110. 
25. On March 3, 2014, Plaintiff filed this case again, alleging that 
Defendant Cao was the surety for the Agreement between Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin.  See CR 3-6.   
26. On December 9, 2014, judgment for the Plaintiff against 
Defendant Lin was entered by the Court.  CR 200-201. 
27. April 29, 2015, a bench trial was held before the Honorable 
Katie Bernards-Goodman.  See Trial Transcript. 
28. At trial, the parties and the Court raised the issue of when 
Defendant Cao’s guarantee expired.  TT 29-32. 
29. At trial, Defendant Cao objected to the introduction of the lease 
agreement and argued that the assignment was impermissible.  TT 45-46. 
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30. The Trial Court ruled that there was a material modification to 
the parties’ contract and Defendant Cao was released from her surety 
obligation.  TT 51. 
31. The Trial Court specifically declined to rule on the assignment.  
TT 51.   
32. The Trial Court did not issue a ruling on the expiration of the 
guarantee.  TT 51. 
33. An Order and Judgment was signed by the Court on May 26, 
2015.   
34. The Plaintiff filed the Notice of Appeal on June 11, 2015.   
35. The Court of Appeals issued its decision on August 25, 2016 
reversing the Trial Court and ordering the Trial Court to enter judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff.   
36. On appeal, Defendant Cao raised the issues of whether her 
obligations under the guarantee expired.  Brief of Appellee pages 13-17. 
37. On appeal, Defendant Cao contested that the assignment was 
not valid.  Brief of Appellee pages 23-25.   
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38. The Court of Appeals did not issue any rulings on either the 
assignment or the expiration issues. See PC Riverview LLC v. Xiao-Yan-
Cao 2016 UT App 178 paragraphs 6, 7 and 8. 
39. The Court of Appeals decision relied solely on whether the 
September 8, 2010 Agreement between Respondent and Defendant Lin 
modified the parties’ contact.  PC Riverview LLC v. Xiao-Yan-Cao 2016 
UT App 178 paragraphs 6, 7 and 8.  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff and Defendant Lin materially 
modified the lease agreement.  The Trial Court found that the Plaintiff in 
allowing Defendant Lin to fall far behind on his rent and to make partial 
payments during this time, without notifying Defendant Cao, materially 
modified the parties’ contract.  The material modification relieved 
Defendant Cao as a surety to the lease agreement.  The Court of Appeals 
failed to review the facts relied upon by the Trial Court.  Instead the Court of 
Appeals chose to focus solely on the Workout Agreement.  This Court 
should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the Trial Court.  Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin made material modifications when the Plaintiff, without 
12 
 
notice to Defendant Cao, allowed Defendant Lin to remain in the premises 
for 20 months prior to initiating their initial complaint1.  This arrangement 
went beyond a mere extension of time, because under this arrangement, 
Defendant Lin incurred substantial late fees.  The Court of Appeals also 
erred in their analysis of the Workout Agreement.  When Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin executed their Workout Agreement in September 2010, that 
Agreement also included late fees.  The Workout Agreement went beyond 
an extension of time to make payments.  The Workout Agreement included 
the late fee penalty.  The Workout Agreement also modified the late fees due 
under the original contract.  By proceeding in this manner, Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin exposed Defendant Cao to excessive late charges under the 
original contract and then modified those charges under the Workout 
Agreement.  The Court should issue a ruling requiring that extensions of 
time must be agreed upon by the surety to a contract.  The Court should 
reverse Court of Appeals because even an extension of time under prior 
Utah Supreme Court precedents find that such extensions are a material 
modification which relief the surety.  Finally, there remained outstanding 
                                                 
1 Even when the Plaintiff initiated their complaint, they did not seek to evict 
Defendant Lin.  When Defendant Cao brought a motion to evict Defendant 
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issues that needed to be resolved by the Trial Court.  The Court of Appeals 
should have remanded this case back to the Trial Court for resolution of 
those issues prior to directing a judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT LIN MODIFIED THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT  
The Trial Court determined that a material modification occurred 
“when they had Mr. Lin’s rent so far behind and allowed him to make 
changes and differences to that and didn’t notify the guarantor of that.  If I’m 
guaranteeing something and there’s changes like that and somebody’s way 
behind and they’re letting them catch up and they’re not telling me, I would 
consider that a material modification.”  Trial Transcript page 51-52.  In 
reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals stated “Cao was not relieved 
of her obligations as guarantor because the Workout was the sole 
modification to the original lease, and the Workout only modified the timing 
of the Tenant’s payments by extending the time in which past due rent could 
be paid.”  Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision page 4.  The statement 
by the Court of Appeals was incorrect on two levels.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Lin, Plaintiff, not Defendant Lin, opposed the motion.   
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First, the Workout Agreement was not the sole modification to the 
parties’ agreement.  Well before the Workout Agreement, Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin engaged in a series of actions that ran contrary to their 
obligations under the Lease Agreement.  It was these actions that the Trial 
Court relied on in its ruling.  The Court of Appeals failed to properly address 
these events.  When the Court examines the actions of Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin prior to the Workout Agreement, the Court will reach the 
same conclusion as the Trial Court.   
Second, the Workout Agreement modified more than the timing of the 
Tenant’s rent payments.  The Workout Agreement made material 
modifications to the late payment provisions under the lease.  The Workout 
did not fully waive the late fees.  Instead, it lessened the late fees if 
Defendant Lin successful completed the Workout.  If Defendant Lin failed 
to complete the Workout, it reinstated the late fees that were incurred 
because Plaintiff and Defendant Lin agreed that Defendant Lin should make 
partial rent payments over several month.  Finally, the Workout created did 
not merely extend time for payment it created balloon payments for 
Defendant Lin.   
1. Status and the Applicable Law 
15 
 
The law recognizes that parties to a contract may have different 
obligations and defenses depending on their status.  Defendant Cao signed 
the Assignment and Extension of Lease as an accommodating party.  
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 merely refers to Defendant Cao as “Guarantor.”  
Defendant Cao signed the guaranty of the Lease personally, without 
compensation.  This Court has long recognized the status of non-
compensated sureties: 
Sureties are persons favored by the law. Their obligations are 
ordinarily assumed without pecuniary compensation, and are 
not to be extended by implication or construction. Their 
liability is, as it is put, strictissimi juris. They have a right to 
stand on the terms of their obligation, and, having consented to 
be bound to a certain extent only, their liability must be found 
within the terms of that consent, strictly construed. It is not 
sufficient that he may sustain no injury by a change in the 
contract, or that it may even be for his benefit. He has a right to 
stand on the very terms of his contract, and if he does not assent 
to any variation of it and a variation is made, it is fatal. M.H. 
Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 
998 (1922) 
 
The Courts’ uniformly recognize that there is a significant difference 
between sureties for profit and those who are personal sureties.  
The modern authorities seem to be almost a unit upon the 
proposition that a different rule of construction applies to 
different classes of sureties.  In the case of a private or 
voluntary surety without compensation the surety is held to be a 
16 
 
favorite of the law, and the contract, the performance of which 
he guarantees, is construed strictly in favor of the surety.  
Strictissimi juris is the term used to express the rule by which 
his liability shall be determined.  Dennis Dillon Oldsmobile, 
GMC, Inc. v. Zdunich, Utah, 668 P.2d 557, 560 (1983) quoting 
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 
211 P. 998 (1922)) 
 
This Court affirmed the application of these principals in U–M Invs. v. 
Ray, 701 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Utah 1985) (We recognize that in construing the 
terms of a bond executed by a voluntary or private surety, the rule of 
strictissimi juris applies, and the private surety's liability is limited by the 
terms of the contract.  Under the concept of Strictissimi juris, a creditor may 
not make alterations to the parties’ contractual relationship.   “Dealings 
between the debtor and the primary obligor which materially modify the 
terms of the guarantor's undertaking generally result in the discharge of the 
guarantor's obligation.”  Carrier Brokers, Inc. v. Spanish Trail, 751 P.2d 258, 
261 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) quoting Essex Int'l, Inc. v. Clamage, 440 F.2d 
547, 550 (7th Cir.1971). See also Baldwin v. Becker, 277 F. 930, 933-34 (8th 
Cir, 1921) (Any change in the contract, on which they are sureties, made by 
the principal parties to it without their assent, discharges them, . . . Nor does 
it matter how trivial the change, or even that it may be of advantage to the 
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sureties. They have a right to stand upon the very terms of their 
undertaking.)  Under these principals, any material alteration by Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin to the underlying obligation relieved Defendant Cao of her 
surety obligation. 
2. The Initial Modification 
The Trial Court determined that Plaintiff and Defendant Lin modified 
the Lease through their subsequent actions, rather than through the Workout 
Agreement.  Defendant Lin first fell behind in his rent in October 2008.  
Over the next twenty months, Defendant Lin continued to incur past due rent 
and late fees to the sum of $20,050.12.  During this time, there is no 
evidence that the Plaintiff took any action to evict Defendant Lin.  
Defendant Lin benefited from this arrangement because he continued to 
operate his restaurant without the fear of eviction.  Plaintiff benefitted from 
the partial payments from Defendant Lin and the presumption that 
Defendant Cao, as Guarantor, would ultimately be financially responsible 
for both the past due rent and the late fees of Defendant Lin.  During these 
twenty months, neither Plaintiff nor Defendant Lin took any action to notify 
Defendant Cao of her increasing financial obligation under the Lease. The 
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actions of Plaintiff and Defendant Lin formed the basis for the Trial Court’s 
determination that they modified the parties’ contract. 
The determination of whether a contractual breach is material is a 
question of fact. Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App 137, ¶ 25, 234 P.3d 1156, 
cert. denied, 241 P.3d 771.  Likewise, whether there is a modification to the 
parties’ contract is also a question of fact. See generally Richard Barton 
Enters., Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) and also the 
concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Howe at 384(“Whether a 
contract has been modified by the parties thereto is ordinarily a question of 
fact for the trier of fact, as where the evidence is conflicting or the terms of 
the agreement are equivocal or uncertain.” Johnson v. Allied Stores Corp., 
106 Idaho 363, 679 P.2d 640, 645 (1984)). The trial court’s factual findings 
should not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Burton Lumber & 
Hardware Co. v. Graham, 2008 UT App 207, ¶ 8, 186 P.3d 1012.  The 
Court of Appeals failed to attack the factual determination which formed the 
basis for the Trial Court’s decision.  Because the Trial Court’s decision was 
based on the factual determination that the actions of Plaintiff and Defendant 
Lin constituted a modification of the contract, this Court should reverse the 
Court of Appeals.  
19 
 
 
The Trial Court’s determination is also legally sound.  Although the 
rule of strictissimi juris applies to Defendant Cao’s defenses and obligations, 
ordinary tests of the meaning and intentions of the parties still applies.  U–M 
Invs. v. Ray, 701 P.2d 1061, 1062 (Utah 1985).   When interpreting the 
contract of the parties, the Courts should look at principals applicable to all 
contracts.   
Plaintiff temporarily suspended their enforcement of the eviction 
rights under the Court while allowing late fees to accumulate against 
Defendant Cao without her knowledge or approval.   This Court has held 
that temporarily suspending the right of enforcement against the principal 
debtor without knowledge and approval of the surety, relieved the surety of 
further liability on the original contract.  First Nat. Bank of Layton v. Egbert, 
663 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah 1983)(relying on §70A-3-606 U.C.A.).  It is clear that 
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin suspended Plaintiff’s right of enforcement under 
the contract to allow Defendant Lin more time to pay his back rent.  At the 
same time, Plaintiff benefitted from this suspension by way of the ever 
increasing late fees.  On this basis alone, the Trial Court was warranted in 
finding that there was a material modification.  Although §70A-3-606 
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U.C.A. may not be applicable to this case, the same principals can be applied 
to these dealings through the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
Both Plaintiff and Defendant Lin modified their obligation to 
Defendant Cao under the principals of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is present in every 
contract.  Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, parties to a 
contract impliedly promise not to intentionally do anything to injure the 
other party's right to receive the benefits of the contract. Eggett v. Wasatch 
Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, ¶ 14, 94 P.3d 193.  In this case, Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin modified that implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
by taking actions the strictly benefitted themselves while injuring Defendant 
Cao. Plaintiff benefitted from additional late fees and Defendant Lin 
benefitted from the operation of his restaurant while making partial rent 
payments.  Defendant Cao, without any knowledge of this arrangement, was 
unable to bring any action earlier to assert her rights and protect her 
interests.  Even when Defendant Cao did attempt to assert her rights by 
seeking Defendant Lin’s eviction, Plaintiff opposed the eviction in order to 
maintain this beneficial relationship. Plaintiff actions were again contrary to 
the covenant.  The covenant prevents a party from impeding the other's 
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rights under the contract. Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App 379, ¶ 18, 173 
P.3d 865.    The Trial Court properly determined that the actions of Plaintiff 
and Defendant Lin modified the parties’ obligations under the Lease.  The 
Trial Court determined that the actions of the Plaintiff and Defendant Lin 
violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing towards Defendant Cao.  
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin altered the Lease when they disregarded their 
obligations of good faith and fair dealing. This Court should reverse the 
Court of Appeals on this basis. 
3. The Workout was More than an Extension of Time 
The Court of Appeal’s improperly determined “the Workout only 
modified the timing of the Tenant’s payments by extending the time in 
which past due rent could be paid.”  Court of Appeals Memorandum 
Decision page 4.  The four corners of the Workout contradict that statement.  
The Workout states:  
“We agree to write off $6,451.28, of which is 7/8 of the late charges 
if, and only if, the monthly back balance payments are received in the 
Landlord’s office on or before each payment due date.   
If any payments are late, you agree to pay the previous late charges 
amount of $6,451.28 as well as any additional interest, collection/legal fees, 
or late charges that may accrue based on the lease.”  Defendant’s Trial 
Exhibit 2. 
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By its own terms, the Workout not only restructured the timing of the lease 
payments, it also restructured the late payments due.   
 Plaintiff restructure the amount of late fees due under the Lease.  
Plaintiff also made that restructured amount contingent completion of the 
Workout Agreement.  By its own language, the Workout Agreement went 
beyond extending the time for payment.  Because the Workout Agreement 
modified the parties’ obligations under the Lease, Defendant Cao had the 
right to object under the principal of strictissimi juris. Defendant Cao had 
the right to stand on the terms of her original obligation.  Whether Defendant 
Cao sustained no injury from the change, or that it may have been to her 
benefit it does not matter. Defendant Cao’s right to stand on the very terms 
of the original contract, and her refusal to consent to the Workout is fatal to 
the Plaintiff’s claim against her. M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety 
Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 (1922).   
 In addition to modifying the late fee provisions of the lease, the 
Workout Agreement created balloon payments for Defendant Lin.  Although 
Defendant Lin’s rent payments for September 2010 through December 2010 
were supposed to be $5,416.92, Defendant Lin paid $9,416.92.  These 
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potential balloon payments could have seriously undermined the remaining 
financial viability of the restaurant and to the detriment of Defendant Cao. 
Defendant Cao’s refusal to consent to the Workout was not without 
reason.  Plaintiff allowed Defendant Lin to make partial rent payments for 
several months without notifying Defendant Cao.  During this time, 
Defendant Cao’s financial burden increased without any notice from either 
party.  Defendant Cao reasonably concluded that Plaintiff and Defendant Lin 
would continue to work together to the financial detriment of Defendant 
Cao.  This fear was also reinforced by the circumstances surrounding the 
creation of the Workout.  After Defendant Cao filed a Motion to Evict 
Defendant Lin, Plaintiff, not Defendant Lin, opposed the Motion. It was 
through the Plaintiff’s Motion that Defendant Cao finally learned the extent 
to which Plaintiff was permitting Defendant Lin to make the partial rent 
payments, incurring late fees and financially exposing Defendant Cao.  After 
Defendant Cao filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin negotiated the Workout Agreement without the knowledge or 
consent of Defendant Cao.  Plaintiff then filed a Memorandum in Opposition 
to Summary Judgment without notifying Defendant Cao or the Court 
regarding the Workout Agreement.  It was only after Defendant Cao 
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received a favorable ruling that the Plaintiff provided a copy of the Workout 
Agreement.  It was reasonable for Defendant Cao no longer wanted to be 
financially attached to any agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Lin. 
Because the Workout Agreement modified the late fees due under the 
Lease and created balloon payments, the Court of Appeals’ assertion that it 
merely extended the time for payment is incorrect.  The Court of Appeals’ 
reliance on the Restatement (Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (Am. 
Law Inst. 1996) and its decision in DiMeo v. Nupetco Associates, 2013 UT 
App 188, 309 P.3d 251, are misplaced.  The facts in this case do not fit 
within the exception that an extension of time does not relieve a secondary 
obligor when there is a modification.  If the Court affirms the exception that 
an extension does not modify the underlying agreement the Court should 
narrowly construe that exception.  Based on the facts before this Court, that 
exception in not applicable. The Court should reverse the Court of Appeals. 
II. AN EXTENSION OF TIME DOES MATERIALLY MODIFY A 
LEASE 
This Court has not previously adopted the position that an extension 
of time for payment is not a material modification of a contract.  In dicta, 
this Court seemingly adopted a more strict approach when the Court said 
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that a Surety “has a right to stand on the very terms of his contract, and if he 
does not assent to any variation of it and a variation is made, it is fatal. 
M.H. Walker Realty Co. v. American Surety Co., 60 Utah 435, 211 P. 998 
(1922).  The Court should reject exception as stated in the Restatement 
(Third) of Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (Am. Law Inst. 1996) and adopted 
by the Court of Appeals in DiMeo v. Nupetco Associates, 2013 UT App 
188, 309 P.3d 251 and hold that extensions of time for payment without the 
consent of the Surety, modify the contract and relieve the Surety.   
Even the Court of Appeals’ determination that the Workout 
Agreement was a mere extension of time still warrants restrictions of such 
extensions.  This Court has held that a surety for hire will not be relieved 
from his contract by an extension of time without showing injury.  Murray 
City v. Banks, 62 Utah 296, 219 P. 246.  The problem with this approach is 
that it is uneconomical.  It encourages the principal obligor and oblige to 
engage in behavior that may very well be contrary to the interests of the 
surety without the surety’s knowledge.  
There is a practical reason for requiring the Surety to sign off on 
extensions of time before the damage is done.  When the Surety signs off to 
the underlying contract, the Surety is in the best position to evaluate the 
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principal’s default on the underlying contract.    When there is an extension, 
that Surety is also in the best position to determine the impact on the Surety.  
The facts in this case support that proposition.  For twenty months, the 
Plaintiff extended the time for Defendant Lin to pay his full rent.  During 
this time, Plaintiff continued to levy ever increasing late fees.  Had the 
Plaintiff sought Defendant Cao’s input, Defendant Cao could have made up 
the monthly difference in the rent.  Defendant Cao could seek that 
difference directly from Defendant Lin.  Economically, Defendant Cao 
would have been in a much stronger position to extract this amount from 
Defendant Lin because neither Defendant Lin nor Defendant Cao would 
have been incurring unnecessary late fees.  In addition, Defendant Cao 
could have sought concessions from Defendant Lin in the operation of the 
restaurant so as to insure its financial viability and thus limiting Defendant 
Cao’s future exposure.  
The Court of Appeals has restricted lease guarantees to the length of 
the original lease.  Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 68 (Utah 
Ct.App.1994).  This approach is consistent with the concept that the surety 
should only be bound to the contract that the surety guaranteed.  Guarantees 
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represent credit risks for sureties.  Extending payments beyond the contract 
length would extend the credit risk without the sureties assent.   
The credit risk of extensions beyond the length of the contract also 
are present when balloon payments are involved.  This Lease Agreement, 
like most leases, required set monthly payments.  Monthly lease payments 
for small businesses and landlords are practical.  Rarely does a small 
business have the funds to prepay on their lease.  Rarely would a landlord 
allow a tenant to occupy a unit for a lengthy period of time with the 
expectation that the tenant would just pay the lease amounts in full at the 
end of the tenancy.  Business plans for both the tenant and the landlord are 
made on the expectations of monthly payments.  When Plaintiff agreed to 
allow Defendant Lin to remain in the property while making balloon 
payments for past due rent, Plaintiff and Defendant Lin engage in behavior 
that increased the likelihood of Defendant Lin’s business failing by 
substantially increasing his monthly expenses.  Defendant Cao should have 
been afforded the opportunity to evaluate this arrangement in accordance 
with the risks that were being place on her in the event of the failure of the 
restaurant.  In this case, had the Workout not worked, Defendant Cao would 
have been on the hooked for the past rent and late fees and Defendant Cao 
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would have been responsible for Defendant Lin’s rent during the Workout 
time.  The Workout may have been the optimal arrangement, but it was for 
all of the parties to make that determination, not just the Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin.   
All extensions have the potential of modifying the risks to the surety.  
Because the surety is in the best position to determine the risks to the 
surety, the Court should find that any extension to be a material 
modification which requires the agreement of the surety. 
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS SHOULD HAVE REMANDED 
THIS MATTER FOR ADDITIONAL FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS 
At trial and on appeal, Defendant Cao raised to additional reasons 
why she should not be liable for Defendant Lin’s debt.  First, Defendant Cao 
argued that she signed the Lease and Extension of Lease because she was the 
Guarantor on the prior lease and she signed as an accommodating party.  
Second, Defendant Cao argued that there was not an appropriate assignment 
of the lease.  Because the Trial Court found that there was a material 
modification of the lease, the Trial Court declined to make any further 
rulings.  The Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals failed to 
address Defendant Cao alternate arguments.  Because both arguments need 
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factual determinations by the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals should have 
remanded this matter.  When the Trial Court fails to make critical factual 
determinations necessary to resolve the legal issue, it is appropriate to 
remand the case back to the Trial Court. Pioneer Builders Co. v. KDA Corp., 
2012 UT 74, ¶ 30, 292 P.3d 672  see also Colonial Pacific Leasing Corp. v. 
J.W.C.J.R. Corp. (Utah App.1999), ¶ 24, 977 P.2d 541.   
1. Defendant Cao was the Guarantor on the Prior Lease and Her 
Obligations Expired with That Lease 
Defendant Cao, throughout this process was merely a guarantor on the 
prior lease.  The tenant prior to Defendant Lin was L & C Unlimited 
Corporation.  L & C Unlimited Corporation signed Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 as 
the Assignor.  Defendant Cao signed Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 as a Guarantor.  
The Plaintiff never sought to make L & C Unlimited a party to this action.  
Because the Plaintiff failed to bring in L & C Unlimited, all obligations of 
the Assignor have been waived by the Plaintiff.  Those obligations cannot be 
transferred to Defendant Cao personally merely because the Plaintiff asserts 
that she is the Assignor.  Defendant Cao is merely an accommodating party 
throughout these transactions. 
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An examination of the history of the leases, assignments and 
extensions helps to determine the intent of the parties.  Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 
is a Lease Extension and Modification between Riverview Properties and 
Chai Teng Tsao and Hong Min Zhang (Tsao and Zhang).  Under paragraph 
4 of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, the lease extension expired on September 30, 2003.  
There was no guarantor to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5.  At the end of the lease term 
of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5, Riverview Properties and Tsao and Zhang sought to 
assign the interest Tsao and Zhang had in the lease to L & C Unlimited in 
Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6. Defendant Cao became the Guarantor in Plaintiff’s 
Exhibit 6.  L & C Unlimited became the Tenant in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6.  The 
lease with the landlord, Riverview Properties, was extended to September 
30, 2008.  In paragraph 4 of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6, Cao is specifically named 
as the Guarantor to this lease, thereby obligating Defendant Cao until 
September 30, 2008.   In March 2006, L & C Unlimited sought to transfer its 
interest in the lease to Defendant Lin.  Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 states that the 
“Landlord, Assignor and Assignee desire to extend this Lease for an 
additional Five (5) year(s) period.”  Plaintiff Exhibit 7 page 2.  There is no 
mention of the guarantor’s intention to extend the lease.  In addition, 
although the lease repeatedly uses the singular when referring to the 
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Guarantor, the extension has the signatures of two guarantors.  Defendant 
Cao signed Plaintiff Exhibit 7 as Guarantor on page 4.  However, Plaintiff’s 
Exhibit 7 contains a specific Guarantor provision on page 6.  The specific 
guaranty was signed by Defendant Lin.  Defendant Cao signed Plaintiff 
Exhibit 7 because Defendant Cao was the Guarantor on the prior lease that 
was set to expire on September 30, 2008.  As Guarantor to that lease, 
Defendant Cao was giving her approval to the assignment of the lease to 
Defendant Lin.  Had the lease been assigned and extended without 
Defendant Cao’s approval, Defendant Cao’s obligation would have expired 
immediately on the transfer.  Under the prior lease, Defendant Cao remained 
obligated to the Riverview Properties until September 30, 2008.  By 
approving of the transfer, Defendant Cao remained obligated until the prior 
lease expired on September 30, 2008.  Defendant Lin, in signing the explicit 
Guaranty attached to Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7 was then the designated Guarantor 
for the entire period of the extension.    Defendant Cao’s Guarantor 
obligations were specifically defined by paragraph 4 of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 6.  
Defendant Lin’s obligations were specifically defined by his Guaranty at the 
end of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 7.  Plaintiff acknowledged that Defendant Cao 
signed the Extension because of her status as the Guarantor in the prior 
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lease.  Plaintiff merely assumed that Defendant Cao guaranty lasted as long 
as Defendant Lin was in the property.  (TT page 30).  “We accept the 
general principle that in determining the nature and extent of the guarantor's 
liability under a guaranty of payment of rent ... the general rules of 
construction apply, and the contract will be strictly construed to impose only 
those burdens clearly within its terms.”  Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 
886 P.2d 61, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Orange–Co., Inc. v. Brown, 181 Ind.App. 536, 393 N.E.2d 192, 196 (1979)).  
Defendant Cao’s guaranty of the lease only covered the obligations under 
her lease.  Defendant Cao’s obligation did not extend for as long as 
Defendant Lin occupied the space, as the Plaintiff urges. See Trolley Square 
Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 68 (Utah Ct.App.1994).  By having 
Defendant Lin sign as a Guarantor under the lease extension, it is clear that 
the parties’ intent was that Defendant Lin would be the Guarantor under the 
extension.  Defendant Cao’s specific obligations expired as of September 30, 
2008 when her portion of the lease expired.  The Plaintiff provided no 
evidence that Plaintiff incurred any damages prior to September 30, 2008.  
On this basis, the Court should uphold the decision of the Trial Court.  In the 
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alternative, the Court should remand this matter to the Trial Court for a 
decision on this issue. 
2. There was No Appropriate Assignment 
When Defendant Cao signed the guaranty, she signed it with 
Riverview Properties.  Several months after Defendant Cao signed the 
guaranty, Plaintiff acquired the property from Riverview Properties.  
Defendant Cao was never informed of this transfer.  When Defendant Cao 
was initially sued, Defendant Cao did not know PC Riverview at all.  (TT 
page 40-41).  Defendant Cao believed her guarantee was with Riverview 
Properties.  (TT page 41).   
Defendant Cao raised the lack of privity of contract in the parties’ first 
litigation.  In that litigation, the Plaintiff failed to present any evidence of the 
transfer of interest which would allow the Plaintiff to proceed against 
Defendant Cao.  The Court agreed with Defendant Cao’s position, but stayed 
the ruling to allow the parties to work out an agreement. Defendant’s Exhibit 
12.  Defendant Cao again raise the question of privity of contract at trial. (TT 
                                                 
2 The Court should note that one of the reasons that the Trial Court stayed its 
ruling was because the Plaintiff asserted that if Defendant Cao could find a 
new tenant, Plaintiff would evict Defendant Lin.  The Trial Court stayed its 
ruling to allow the parties to potential reach an agreement.  Plaintiff 
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page 45-46).  The Plaintiff offered Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1, a photo copy of a 
purported assignment from Riverview Properties to the Plaintiff.  Plaintiff’s 
Exhibit 1 contains the signatures of Orin R. Woodbury, and Roger T. Sharp.  
Neither signature is dated or notarized.  No affidavits from Mr. Woodbury or 
Mr. Sharp were offered to authenticate their signatures.  Neither Mr. 
Woodbury nor Mr. Sharp testified at trial.  The only evidence offered to 
authenticate this document was the testimony of Grace Mitchell, President of 
the Plaintiff, who merely stated that she was present when Mr. Woodbury 
and Mr. Sharp signed the documents. (TT page 9).  Prior to its admission, 
the Plaintiff’s offered no details surrounding its creation or execution.  The 
Plaintiff’s offered no verification from a disinterested party.  This document 
lacked a notary, contrary to almost every document concerning Riverview 
Properties offered by the Plaintiff.  See Plaintiff’s Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and 7.  
There was simply insufficient evidence to warrant the Trial Court admitting 
                                                                                                                                                 
however, failed to notify either the Trial Court or Defendant Cao, that 
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin has already reached an agreement.  In fact, 
Plaintiff and Defendant Lin reached their agreement on September 8, 2010.  
Plaintiff filed their Opposition to Defendant’s Cao’s Motion for Summary 
Judgment on September 14, 2010.  In reality, there was no reason for the 
Trial Court to stay the matter for further settlement, because Defendant Lin 
and Plaintiff had already reached an agreement which would negate 
Plaintiff’s offer to evict Defendant Lin.  Plaintiff’s offer was purely illusory.   
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Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 at that stage in the trial without additional foundation 
and authentication.  Although the Trial Court is granted great discretion in 
admitting evidence, the Trial Court abused its’ discretion in this case. 
Documents may be admitted, after authentication, under rule 901 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence.  The rule places the burden of authenticating the 
document on the party seeking its admission. Barrientos ex rel. Nelson v. 
Jones, 2012 UT 33, ¶ 31, 282 P.3d 50.  Without Exhibit 1, Plaintiff has no 
evidence that Plaintiff was assigned the right to pursue this matter against 
Defendant Cao. 
Further, the assignment in Plaintiff’s Exhibit 1 assigns the leases and 
the deposits for those leases.  There is no mention of transfer of the 
guarantees to the leases.  There is no evidence that Riverview Property 
conveyed or intended to convey any guarantees that they had in their 
possession.  Lacking specific language transferring the guarantees, the 
Plaintiff lacks the necessary privity with Defendant Cao to enforce the 
guaranty against her.   Because the evidence was insufficient to support the 
Plaintiff’s claim of assignment, the Court should affirm the decision of Trial 
Court on these grounds.  In the alternative, The Court should remand this 
matter to the Trial Court for a decision on this issue. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision 
of the Trial Court.  The Trial Court properly held that Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin modified the lease agreement by allowing partial payments 
without the knowledge of Defendant Cao.  The modification of Plaintiff and 
Defendant Lin without the approval of Defendant Cao, released Defendant 
Cao as the surety to Plaintiff and Defendant Lin.  The Workout Agreement 
went beyond a mere extension of time and modified the late fee obligations 
of the parties.  The Workout Agreement also modified the Lease terms.  In 
the alternative, a review of the Lease Extension shows that Defendant Cao’s 
obligation as surety expired on September 30, 2008 when the lease between 
Defendant Cao and Riverview Properties expired. Alternately, there is 
insufficient evidence to support the Plaintiff’s claim that Plaintiff was 
assigned the guarantee of Defendant Cao from Riverview Properties.   
Dated: January 23, 2017. 
     _/s/______________________ 
     RUSSELL T. MONAHAN 
     Attorney for Defendant Cao 
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ORME, Judge: 
¶1 Appellant PC Riverview LLC appeals the district court’s 
judgment concluding that the guarantor of a lease, Appellee 
Xiao-Yan Cao, was not liable for amounts owed to Riverview on 
the lease. We reverse. 
¶2 This case arises out of a dispute over unpaid rent for 
premises in a strip mall (the Property). Cao’s business was a 
tenant under a lease that it later assigned to another tenant 
(Tenant) in 2006. To secure the owner’s approval of the lease 
assignment, Cao personally guaranteed Tenant’s obligations 
under the lease, in an agreement entered into among Tenant, 
Cao, and the owner. The agreement provided, in part, as follows: 
PC Riverview v. Cao 
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Assignor and Guarantor agree to and shall remain 
obligated to Landlord for the full performance of 
all covenants, conditions and obligations and 
duties required of Tenant under said Lease and 
shall not be relieved of any performance of 
obligation thereunder as the result of this 
assignment. 
¶3 Some time later, Riverview purchased the strip mall of 
which the Property was a part. The purchase was subject to 
existing leases, including Tenant’s lease. In May 2010, Riverview 
sued Tenant and Cao for payment of past due rent exceeding 
$22,000.00. Riverview and Tenant negotiated an agreement (the 
Workout) that would resolve the lawsuit by extending Tenant’s 
time to pay the delinquent rent.1 Cao was not a party to those 
negotiations, and when Riverview asked her to stipulate to 
dismissal of the action, Cao refused, claiming that the Workout 
rescinded her obligations as the guarantor of the lease.2 The 
district court eventually dismissed the action, without prejudice, 
for failure to prosecute. 
                                                                                                                    
1. According to counsel at oral argument, Tenant actually owed 
common area maintenance fees, not past due rent in the 
colloquial sense. But because the parties refer to the then-
outstanding debt as “rent” in their briefs and because the exact 
nature of the amount owed pursuant to the lease is not relevant 
to our disposition, we refer to the 2010 lawsuit and the Workout 
as regarding rent. 
2. Cao characterizes the Workout as “[t]he restructuring of lease 
payments.” But as she acknowledges, the only change it effected 
was the extension of time to make payments, and the district 
court characterized the Workout as an extension of time to pay 
acknowledged debts. 
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¶4 Thereafter, Tenant continued to make all payments due 
under the lease and the Workout until shortly before the 
expiration of the lease, and he occupied the Property until the 
lease term ended on September 30, 2013. He failed, however, to 
pay the last month’s rent and a portion of the previous month’s 
rent. Riverview again sued Tenant and Cao for payment of the 
past due rent. The district court determined that Tenant owed 
Riverview $7,326.55 in unpaid rent, $1,208.88 in prejudgment 
interest, $117.00 in costs, and $1,400 in attorney fees. The court 
also determined that the Workout constituted a material 
modification of the lease, thus relieving Cao of her obligations as 
guarantor. Therefore, the court concluded, “Cao is not liable for 
the judgment obtained by Plaintiff P.C. Riverview, LLC against 
[Tenant].” 
¶5 The rights and obligations of a guarantor are often 
defined in the terms of the guaranty. 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty 
§ 53 (2016) (“[T]he terms and provisions of a guaranty should 
generally be construed according to the intention of the parties 
in view of the surrounding circumstances. . . . [T]he parties’ 
intent is defined by the written terms of the guaranty.”). See also 
Seftel v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.2d 941, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(concluding that guarantors waived their right to a common law 
defense by the “express terms of the original guaranties”). But 
absent express terms to the contrary, “[t]he basic rights and 
duties of parties under a guaranty are governed by common 
law.” 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 53 (2016). Here, the guaranty 
agreement contained no provisions spelling out particular rights 
in favor of Cao, such as a right to notice or a bar on extensions or 
modifications absent her consent. Thus, we apply the common 
law.3 
                                                                                                                    
3. “Where [the parties’] intention may be gathered from the four 
corners of the instrument, interpretation of the guaranty is a 
question of law.” 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 53 (2016). Likewise, 
(continued…) 
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¶6 According to the Restatement, as a general rule a 
guarantor is relieved of her obligations “[i]f the principal obligor 
and the obligee agree to a modification.” Restatement (Third) of 
Suretyship & Guaranty § 41 (Am. Law Inst. 1996). But the 
Restatement specifically excludes “an extension of time” from 
the modifications that would discharge a guarantor. Id. We 
embraced that exception in DiMeo v. Nupetco Associates, 2013 UT 
App 188, 309 P.3d 251, stating that time extensions are “minor 
alterations [and] are not of the nature or degree that would 
trigger a discharge of [guarantor’s] pledge of security under 
suretyship law.” Id. ¶ 9 n.2. 
¶7 Here, Cao was not relieved of her obligations as 
guarantor because the Workout was the sole modification to the 
original lease, and the Workout only modified the timing of 
Tenant’s payments by extending the time in which past due rent 
could be paid. See supra note 2. Furthermore, the Workout 
caused Cao no harm. Indeed, it actually benefitted her. She was 
“obligated to Landlord for the full performance of all . . . duties 
required of Tenant under said Lease,” which included paying 
the remaining unpaid rent. Without the Workout, she would 
have been liable for at least $22,000 in past due rent as well as 
the rents coming due for the balance of the lease term. Instead, 
because of the Workout, Tenant satisfied the bulk of that 
obligation, correspondingly reducing Cao’s liability. 
¶8 Because the Workout only extended the time for Tenant 
to pay past due rent, it was not a material modification of the 
                                                                                                                    
(…continued) 
application of the common law presents a question of law. 
Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 2001 UT 
112, ¶ 18, 38 P.3d 291. “We review questions of law for 
correctness[.]” Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality 
Board, 2006 UT 74, ¶ 9, 148 P.3d 960. 
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original agreement. As a result, Cao’s obligations as guarantor 
were not discharged. Therefore, we reverse the judgment in 
favor of Cao and remand the case to the district court for the 
entry of an appropriate judgment against Cao.4 
 
                                                                                                                    
4. The basic amount of that judgment will be the same as the 
judgment entered against Tenant. Riverview has requested and 
is also entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in this appeal, in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement entered into among Tenant, Cao, and the prior 
owner: “In the event of default under any of the terms of this 
Agreement or the Lease, defaulting party agrees to pay all costs 
incurred in enforcing this Agreement or the Lease or any right 
arising ou[t] of the breach of either, and including reasonable 
attorney’s fees.” On remand, the amount of that award will be 
determined by the trial court. 
